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Abstract
Artificial intelligence develops techniques and systems whose performance must be evaluated on a
regular basis in order to certify and foster progress in the discipline. We will describe and critically assess
the different ways AI systems are evaluated. We first focus on the traditional task-oriented evaluation
approach. We see that black-box (behavioural evaluation) is becoming more and more common, as AI
systems are becoming more complex and unpredictable. We identify three kinds of evaluation: human
discrimination, problem benchmarks and peer confrontation. We describe the limitations of the many
evaluation settings and competitions in these three categories and propose several ideas for a more
systematic and robust evaluation. We then focus on a less customary (and challenging) ability-oriented
evaluation approach, where a system is characterised by its (cognitive) abilities, rather than by the tasks
it is designed to solve. We discuss several possibilities: the adaptation of cognitive tests used for humans
and animals, the development of tests derived from algorithmic information theory or more general
approaches under the perspective of universal psychometrics.
Keywords: AI evaluation, AI competitions, benchmark evaluation, sampling, narrow vs general AI,
measurement, universal psychometrics, Turing Test.
1 Introduction
The evaluation of any discipline must necessarily be linked to the purpose of the discipline. What is the
purpose of artificial intelligence (AI)? McCarthy’s pristine definition of AI sets this unambiguously: “[AI is]
the science and engineering of making intelligent machines” [123]. As a consequence, AI evaluation should
focus on evaluating the intelligence of the artefacts it builds. However, as we will further discuss below,
‘intelligence tests’ (of whatever kind) are not the everyday evaluation approach for AI. The explanation for
this is that most AI research is better identified by Minsky’s more pragmatic definition: “[AI is] the science
of making machines capable of performing tasks that would require intelligence if done by [humans]” [129,
p.v]. As a result, AI evaluation focusses on checking whether machines do these tasks well.
This has led to an important anomaly of AI. AI artefacts solve these tasks without featuring intelligence.
Paradoxically, this is one of the reasons of AI success. Systems are designed for a particular functionality and
perform their task more predictably than humans, from driving cars to supply chain planning. Frequently,
some tasks are not considered AI problems any more, once they are solved without full-fledged intelligence.
This phenomenon is known as the “AI effect” [124]. It would be unfair, however, to deny that some current
AI systems, especially those that incorporate some learning potential, exhibit some intelligent behaviour.
∗This paper corresponds to a lecture given for the Summer School of the Spanish Association for Artificial Intelligence, in
A Corun˜a, Spain, September 2014.
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Anyway, it is not the purpose of this paper to dig further into the time-worn debate between narrow AI
vs. general AI. Both approaches are valid and genuine parts of AI research. It is useful to have specialised AI
systems that solve specific tasks, as well as systems that have abilities so that they can solve new problems
they have never faced before. The intention of stressing this duality is that this should necessarily pervade
the evaluation procedures in AI. Specialised AI systems should require a task-oriented evaluation, while
general AI systems should require an ability-oriented evaluation.
This paper pays attention to the way evaluation is done in AI. As any science and engineering discipline,
measuring is crucial for AI. Disciplines progress when they have objective evaluation tools to measure the
elements and objects of study, assess the prototypes and artefacts that are being built and examine the
discipline as a whole. As we will discuss in subsequent sections, despite the significant progress in the past
couple of decades (with the generalisation of several AI benchmarks and competitions) there is still a huge
margin of improvement in the way AI systems are evaluated. This is partially because we do not see AI
evaluation as a measurement process[64]. Also, it is probably a crucial moment to overhaul the way AI
evaluation is performed, after the recent progress in areas of AI that are detaching from the narrow AI
approach, such as developmental robotics [8], deep learning [7], inductive programming [69, 63][62], artificial
general intelligence [60], universal artificial intelligence [88], etc.
By overhauling AI evaluation, we aim at filling a gap, because, to our knowledge, there is no comprehensive
analysis about how evaluation is performed in AI and how it can be improved and adapted to the challenges
of the future. Some previous works discussing AI evaluation [132, 56, 138, 57, 33, 105, 106, 21, 151, 11,
50, 104, 108, 183, 44, 6, 119, 145] are relatively old, non-comprehensive, restrictive to a specific area of AI,
limited to one particular approach and/or focussed on the experimental methodology rather than what is
being measured and how. Nonetheless, we will refer to many of these works along the text.
Some ideas of the old analysis still hold today. For instance, in [29] we find criteria for evaluating research
problems, methods, implementations, experiments’ design, and evaluation of the experiments. In the criteria
for experiments’ design, we see several of the topics we will address in the paper: “1. How many examples
can be demonstrated?” (are they sufficient and qualitative different and illustrative?), “2. Should the
program’s performance be compared to a standard?”, “3. What are the criteria for good performance?”, “4.
Does the program purport to be general (domain-independent)?” (do the domains being tested constitute
a representative class?), and “5. Is a series of related programs being evaluated?”. Other statements in
[29] are not so up-to-date, and show that there has been an improvement in AI evaluation. For instance,
we found the recommendation “that editors, program committees, and reviewers should begin to insist on
evaluation.”. Today this recommendation has been generalised (e.g., [31] report that more than 60% of
ICAIL papers in 1987 did not have any evaluation in front of 20% in 2011). Hence, a lack of evaluation is
no longer the problem. However, there is still a great deal of disaggregation, many ad-hoc procedures, bad
habits and loopholes about what is being measured and how is being measured. In this paper, the focus will
be set on these issues.
We will start with a state of the art of the task-oriented evaluation approach in AI, by far more common in
AI research. The notion of performance is relatively easy to determine as it is directly linked to the set or class
of problems we are interested in for the evaluation. Nonetheless, we will identify several problems, most of
them derived from the confusion of a task definition with its evaluation. An appropriate sampling procedure
from the class of problems defining the task is not always easy. We will give some hints to derive better
evaluation protocols. With this perspective we will argue that white-box evaluation (by algorithm inspection)
is becoming less predominant in AI, and we will focus the rest of the paper to black-box evaluation (by
behaviour). We will distinguish three types of behavioural evaluation: by human discrimination (performing
a comparison against or by humans), problem benchmarks (a repository or generator of problems) and by peer
confrontation (1-vs-1 or multi-agent ‘matches’). We will survey some of the competitions and repositories in
these three categories and highlight some problems in how these evaluation settings are held and used.
In a second part of the paper, we will pay attention to the more elusive and challenging problem of
ability-based evaluation. The three types of evaluation seen for task-oriented evaluation are not directly
applicable, as we now do not want to evaluate systems for what they do but for what they are able to (learn
to) do. In other words, we are looking for signs or indications that show that the system has a certain ability.
One idea that has been around since the inception of AI is to use human (or animal) intelligence tests, such
as the IQ-tests used in psychometrics. Each particular test tries to identify a series of exercises that are
representative (necessary and sufficient) for a given ability. We will briefly discuss their use and possible
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adaptation for the evaluation of AI systems. A quite different approach is based on algorithmic information
theory (AIT), where problem classes and their difficulty are derived from computational principles. In this
way, we are sure about what we are actually evaluating. Also, exercise generators can be derived from first
principles.
While task-oriented evaluation is opposed to ability-oriented evaluation in this paper, we can have a more
gradual view in terms of task classes that go from specific to general. Also, we will analyse a more unified
view that integrates the different evaluation paradigms and procedures that we find in many disciplines,
depending on the subject that is being measured. This view, known as ‘universal psychometrics’, is based on
the notion of ‘universal test’. This unified approach makes it possible that the schemas that were identified
for the task-based evaluation can be generalised to the ability-based evaluation problem.
The rest of the paper goes along the organisation described above, with two parts: section 2, focussing
on task-oriented evaluation and section 3, focussing on ability-oriented evaluation. This is followed by the
conclusions, which feature some guidelines about how competitions and problem generators can be improved,
integrated or overhauled for a more robust and efficient AI system evaluation.
2 Task-oriented evaluation
AI is a successful discipline. The range of applications has been greatly enlarged over the years. We have
successful applications in computer vision, speech recognition, music analysis, machine translation, text
summarisation, information retrieval, robotic navigation and interaction, automated vehicles, game playing,
prediction, estimation, planning, automated deduction, expert systems, etc. (see, e.g., [139]). Most of these
application problems are specific. This implies that the goals are clear and that researchers can focus on the
problem. This does not mean that we are not allowed to use more general principles and techniques to solve
many of these problems, but that the task is sufficiently specific so that systems can be specialised for these
systems. For instance, robotic navigation of a Mars rover can share some of the techniques with a driverless
car on Earth, but the final application is extremely specialised in both cases.
This specialisation leads to an application-specific (task-oriented) evaluation. In fact, going from an
abstract problem to a specific task is encouraged: “refine the topic to a task”, provided it is “representative”
[29]. Given a precise definition of the task, we only need to define a notion of performance from it. Clearly,
we measure performance, and not intelligence. In fact, many of the most successful AI systems solve each
problem in a way that is different to the way humans solve the same problem. Also, AI systems usually
include a great amount of built-in programming and knowledge for the task. It is not unfair to say that we
evaluate the researchers that have designed the system rather than the system itself. For instance, we can
say that it was the research team after Deep Blue [24] (with the help of a powerful computer) who actually
defeated Kasparov.
Disregarding who is to praise for each new successful application, AI systems that address specialised
problems with a clear performance should be easy to evaluate. The reality is not that straightforward, mostly
because there are many different (and usually ad-hoc) evaluation approaches. Let us have a perusal over
them.
2.1 Types of performance measurement in AI
An application, as described above, can be characterised by a set of problems, tasks or exercises M . In
order to evaluate each exercise µ ∈ M we can get a measurement R(π, µ) of the performance of system
π. Measurements can be imperfect. Also, the system, the problem or the measurement may be non-
deterministic. As a result, it is usual to work with the expected value of the performance of π as E[R(π, µ)].
The definition of M and R does not specify how we want to aggregate the results when M has more than
one problem. The most common approaches are1
1Worst-case performance and best-case performance are special cases of a rank-based aggregation (using the cumulative
distribution of results), with other possibilities such as the median, the first decile, etc. Rank-based aggregation, especially
worst-case performance, is more robust to systems getting good scores on many easy problems but doing poorly on the difficult
problems.
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• Worst-case performance2:
Φmin(π,M) = min
µ∈M
E[R(π, µ)]
• Best-case performance:
Φmax(π,M) = max
µ∈M
E[R(π, µ)]
• Average-case performance:
Φ(π,M, p) =
∑
µ∈M
p(µ) · E[R(π, µ)] (1)
where p is a probability distribution on M .
It is assumed that the magnitudes of R for different π ∈M are commensurate. For instance, if R can range
between 0 and 1 for problem µ1 but ranges between 0 and 10,000 for problem µ2, the latter will have a much
higher weight and will dominate the aggregation. This is not necessarily wrong, e.g., if they are measured
with the same unit (e.g., euros). In general, however, R is a construct that needs to be normalised. The
choice of a performance metric that is sufficiently normalised such that the results are commensurate is not
always easy, but possible to some extent (see, e.g., [183]).
At this point, it is pertinent to make a comment about the well-known no-free-lunch (NFL) theorems
[189, 187, 188], as these theorems are usually misunderstood. These theorems state that given all possible
problems, under some particular distributions, no method can work better than any other on average. The
argument to support this interpretation is that, considering all problems, if method πA is better than method
πB for one problem then πB will be worse than πA for another problem. Some people have even interpreted
that research in AI (including search and optimisation problems in computer science) is futile. However,
the NFL theorems can only be applied when the assumptions hold. The conditions state that M must
be infinite and include all possible problems. Also, the problems can be shuffled without affecting the
probability, which can be expressed as “block uniformity” [89], for which the uniform distribution would
be a special case. Nonetheless, these conditions are not plausible if the problems are taken from the real
world. It is unrealistic to assume that the problems we face are taken from a series of random bits, or that a
problem, and its opposite problem (whatever it is) are equally probable. Many other distributions are much
more plausible. A universal distribution [155, 113], e.g., which is consistent with the idea that problems are
generated by physical laws, processes, living creatures, etc., states that random (incompressible) problems
are less likely. So, for many distributions p, the conditions of the NFL do not hold and we have that there
can be methods πA and πB such that: Φ(πA,M, p) > Φ(πB ,M, p). In fact, there can be optimal methods for
inductive inference [107], some free lunches for co-evolution [190], and other areas, although it seems that
for optimisation the free lunches are very small [49].
After this clarification, it is relevant to determine how R is going to be obtained. For relatively simple
solutions, we can analyse the code or the algorithm of the system π. If the code can be well understood
then its computational properties and behaviour can be clearly determined. We use the term ‘white-box’
evaluation when R is inferred through program inspection or algorithm analysis. White-box evaluation is
powerful because we can obtain R theoretically for a given agent π and a problem classM (provided both are
defined theoretically). One common type of problems that are evaluated with a white-box approach are those
where the solution to the problem has to be correct or optimal (i.e., perfect). In this case, the performance
metric R is defined in terms of time and/or space resources. This is the case of classical computational
complexity theory. Worst-case analysis is more common than average-case analysis, although the latter has
also become popular recently [102, 112, 61]. Nonetheless, many AI problems are so challenging nowadays
that perfect solutions are no longer considered as a constraint. Instead, approximate solvers are designed
to optimise a performance metric that is defined in terms of the level of error of the solution and the time
and/or space resources. In this case, the use of an average-case analysis is more common, although worst-case
analysis can also be studied under some paradigms (e.g., Probably Approximately Correct learning [166]).
In agent theory, the behaviour of the agent (and its properties) can be analysed under some paradigms such
as Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) agents (see, e.g., a testability approach in [186]). The theoretical analysis
2Note that this formula does not have the size of the instance as a parameter, and hence it is not comparable to the usual
view of worst-case analysis of algorithms.
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of ‘white-box’ evaluation has also been applied to games. For instance, in board games, algorithms can
be derived and analysed whether they are optimal, such as noughts and crosses (tic-tac-toe) and English
draughts (checkers), the latter solved by Jonathan Schaeffer [141]. Finally, in game theory, the expected
pay-off plays the role of R and optimal strategies can be determined for some simple games, as well as
equilibria and other properties. In games, some results can be obtained independently of the opponent, but
others are only true if we also know the algorithm that the other players are using (so it becomes a double
‘white-box’ approach to evaluation).
As AI systems become more sophisticated, white-box assessment becomes more difficult, if not impossible,
because the unpredictability of complex systems. Many AI systems incorporate many different techniques
and have stochastic behaviours. This is also in agreement with a view of AI as an experimental science
[21, 151]. As a result, a black-box approach, is taken3. This means that R is obtained exclusively from the
behaviour of the system in an empirical way. In this case, average-case evaluation is usual4.
There are many kinds of black-box assessment in AI, but we can group them into three main categories:
• Human discrimination: The assessment is made by and/or against humans through observation,
scrutiny and/or interview. Although it can be based on a questionnaire or a procedure, the assessment
is usually informal and subjective. This type of evaluation is common in psychology, ethology and
comparative psychology. In AI, this kind of evaluation is not very usual, except for the Turing Test
and variants, as we will discuss later on.
• Problem benchmarks: The assessment is performed against a collection or repository of problems (M).
This approach is very frequent in AI, where we have problem libraries, repositories, corpora, etc. It
is also usual in psychology and comparative psychology, although in these areas the tests are not
publicly available to the systems that are to be evaluated. This has been proposed or suggested in AI
occasionally (e.g., the “secret generalized methodology” [183]). For instance, M can be generated in
real time using a problem generator, which actually defines M and p.
• Peer confrontation: The assessment for (multi-agent) games is performed through a series of (1-vs-1
or n-vs-n) matches. The result is relative to the other participants. Given this relative value, in order
to allow for a numerical comparison, sophisticated performance metrics can be derived (e.g., the Elo
system in chess [46]).
The combination of some of the above is also common for evaluation. In what follows, we analyse each of
the three categories in more detail.
2.2 Evaluation by human discrimination
In this first category we include the evaluation approaches that are performed by a comparison with or by
humans. The Turing Test [165, 133] is a case in which there is both comparison against humans and evaluation
by human judges. While the ‘imitation game’ was introduced by Turing as a philosophical instrument in his
response to nine objections against machine intelligence, the game has been (mis-)understood as an actual
test ever since, with the standard interpretation of one human, one machine pretending to be a human, and
a human interrogator through a teletype acting as a judge. The latter must tell which one is the machine
and the human.
Not only has the game been taken as an actual test, but it has had several implementations, such as the
Loebner Prize5, held every year since 1991. Despite the criticisms of how this prize is conducted and its
interpretation through the years, there have been more implementations. In 2014, Kevin Warwick, professor
at the University of Reading organised a similar competition that took place at the Royal Society in London.
Even if the results were not significantly different to previous results of the Loebner Prize (or even what
Weizenbaum’s ELIZA was able to do fifty years ago [180]), the over-reaction and publicity of this outcome
3The distinction between white and black box can be enriched to consider those problems where the solution must be
accompanied by a verification, proof or explanation [66, 3].
4Although it is not uncommon, as we will see, that the set of problems from M are chosen by the research team that is
evaluating its own method, so the probability to choose from M can be biased in such a way that it is actually a best-case
evaluation.
5http://www.loebner.net/Prizef/loebner-prize.html.
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Evaluation Setting Description
Loebner Prize6 General Turing Test implementation.
U. of Reading TT 20147 General Turing Test implementation.
BotPrize8 Contest about bot believability in videogames. [114, 84]
Robo Chat Challenge9 Chattering bots competition.
CAPTCHAs10 Spotting bots in applications requiring humans. [172, 173]
Humies awards11 Human-competitive results using genetic and evolutionary computation. [103]
Graphics Turing Test Tell between a computer-generated virtual world and a real camera. [126, 16]
Table 1: List of some evaluation settings in the human-discrimination category.
were preposterous. The reputation of the implementations of the Turing Test was (further) stained with
statements such as this: “If a computer is mistaken for a human more than 30% of the time during a series
of five minute keyboard conversations it passes the test. No computer has ever achieved this, until now.
Eugene managed to convince 33% of the human judges (30 judges took part [...]) that it was human.” [177].
And Warwick goes on: “We are therefore proud to declare that Alan Turing’s Test was passed for the first
time. [...] This milestone will go down in history as one of the most exciting”.
Is the imitation game a valid test? Even assuming that the times and thresholds are stricter than the
previous incarnations, the Turing Test has many problems as an intelligence test. First, it is a test of
humanity, relative to human characteristics (i.e., anthropocentric). It is neither gradual nor factorial and
needs human intervention (it cannot be automated). If done properly, it may take too much time. Even
so, as we have seen, it can be gamed by non-intelligent chatterbox. As a result, the Turing Test is neither
a sufficient nor a necessary condition for intelligence. Despite the criticism, the Turing Test still has many
advocates [135]. It is also an inspiration for countless philosophical debates and has led to connections with
other concepts in AI or computation [77, 78].
In any case, Turing is not to be blamed by a failure of the Turing Test as a useful test to evaluate AI
systems. Turing did not conceive the test as a practical test to measure intelligence up to and beyond human
intelligence. He is not to blame for a philosophical construct that has had a great impact in the philosophy
and understanding of machine intelligence, but originally a negative impact on its measurement.
Does this mean that we should discard the idea of evaluating AI systems by human judges or by comparing
with humans? Not at all. Recently, there have been variants of the Turing Test (Total Turing Tests [146],
Visual Turing Tests including sensory information, Toddler Turing Tests [5], robotic interfaces, virtual worlds,
etc. [130, 83]) that may be useful for chatterbot evaluation, personal assistants and videogames. It is within
the area of videogames where the notion of ‘believability’ has appeared, which is understood as the property
of a bot of looking ‘believable’ as a human [114, 84]. This term is interesting, as it clearly detaches these
tests from the evaluation of intelligence. In videogames, there are applications where we want bots that can
fool opponents into thinking that they are just another human player. Other highly subjective properties
may also be of interest: enjoyability, resilience, aggressiveness, fun, etc.
Finally, there is a kind of test that is related to the Turing Test, the so-called CAPTCHA (Completely
Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart) [172, 173]. It is said to be a ‘reverse
Turing Test’ because the goal is to tell computers and humans apart in order to ensure that an action or
access is only performed by a human (e.g., making a post, registering in a service, etc.). CAPTCHAs are
quick and practical, omnipresent nowadays. However, they are designed according to the tasks that are
solved by the current state of AI technology. At present, for instance, a common CAPTCHA is a series of
distorted letters, which are usually easy to recognise by humans but not by machines (e.g., current OCR
systems struggle). Logically, when character recognition systems and other techniques improve, current
CAPTCHAs are broken (see, e.g., [23]), and CAPTCHAs need to be updated to more distorted words or to
other tasks that are beyond AI technology. Similarly, the detection of bots in social networks (sybils) and
crowdsourcing platforms rely on tests that are variants of CAPTCHAs, the Turing Test, or the observation
and analysis of user profiles and behaviour [27, 27, 176].
6
Table 1 includes a selection of evaluation settings under the human-discrimination category. As it is not
possible to go into the details of all of them because of brevity, let us choose one that is most representative
and with a strong future projection: the BotPrize competition, which has been held since 2008. This contest
awards the bot that is deemed as more believable (playing like a human) by the other (human) players.
The competition uses a first-person shooter videogame, the DeathMatch game type, as used in Unreal
Tournament 2004. It is important to clarify that the bots do not process the image but receive a description
of it through textual messages in a specific language through the GameBots2004 interface (Pogamut). For
the competition, chatting is disabled (as it is not a chatbot competition). There is a “judging gun” and the
human judges also play, trying to play normally (a prize for the judges exists for those that are considered
more “human” by other judges).
Some questions have been raised about how well the competition evaluates the believability of the par-
ticipants. For instance, believability is said to be better assessed from a third-person perspective (judging
recorded video of other players without playing) than with a first-person perspective [164]. The reason is that
third-person human judges can concentrate on judging and not on not being killed or aiming at high scores.
Actually, this third-person perspective is included in the 2014 competition using a crowdsourcing platform
[115] so that the 2014 edition incorporates the two judging systems: the First-Person Assessment (FPA),
using the BotPrize in-game judging system, and the Third-Person Assessment (TPA), using a crowdsourcing
platform. Another issue that could be considered in the future is a richer (and more challenging) represen-
tation of the environment, closer to the way humans perceive the images of the game (such as the graphical
processing required for the Arcade Learning Environment [12] or the General Video Game Competition
[143]).
Finally, as a summary of the limitations and potentials of the human-discrimination category, we first
acknowledge that some variants are being useful. However, the format differs significantly from a standard
Turing Test. For instance, the human-discrimination approach to evaluation can be just solved by a more
traditional interview format with a procedure or storyline (as in psychology interviews), or by an evaluation
through observation (using a committee of dedicated judges). This casts doubts about whether evaluation
by imitation using the standard interpretation of the Turing Test is practical for task-oriented evaluation in
AI. It is the concept that is useful, and deserves being adapted to several applications.
2.3 Evaluation through problem benchmarks
In this very common approach to evaluation,M is defined as a set of problems. This fits equation 1 perfectly.
Necessarily, the quality of the evaluations depends on M and how exhaustively this set is explored. There
are other issues that could compromise the quality of the measurement. For instance, when M is a public
problem repository and is not very large, we have that the systems can specialise for M . Also, the solutions
may also be available beforehand, or can be inferred by humans, so the systems can embed part of the
solutions. In fact, a system can succeed in a benchmark with a small size of M by using a technique known
as the “big switch”, i.e., the system recognises which problem is facing and uses the hardwired solution
for that specific exercise. Things can become worse if the selection of examples from M is made by the
researchers themselves (e.g., the usual procedure in machine learning of selecting 10 or 20 datasets from the
UCI repository [9], as we will discuss below). In general, the size of M and a bona fide attitude to research
somewhat limit these concerns. Nonetheless, it is generally acknowledged that most systems actually embed
what the researchers have learnt from M . In a way, these benchmarks actually evaluate the researchers, not
their systems.
The above-mentioned problem is known as ‘evaluation overfitting’ [183], ‘method overfitting’ problem
[50] or “clever methods of overfitting” [104]. To avoid or reduce this problem, it is much better if M is
very large or infinite, or at least the problems are not disclosed until evaluation time. Problem generators
are an alternative. However, it is not always easy to generate a large M of realistic problems. Generators
can be based on the use of some prototypes with parameter variations or distortions. These prototypes can
6http://www.loebner.net/Prizef/loebner-prize.html
7http://www.reading.ac.uk/news-and-events/releases/PR583836.aspx
8http://botprize.org/
9http://www.robochatchallenge.com/
10http://www.captcha.net/
11http://www.human-competitive.org
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be “based on reality”, so that the generator “takes as input a real domain, analyses it automatically and
generates deformations [...] that follow certain high-level characteristics” [44]. More powerful and diverse
generators can be defined by the use of problem representation languages. A general and elegant approach is
to determine a probabilistic or stochastic generator (e.g., a grammar) of problems, which directly defines the
probability p for the average-case performance equation 1. Nonetheless, it is not easy to make a generator
that can rule out unusable or Frankenstein problems. In other domains, problems are taken from real life
(e.g., pedestrian detection), and having a large number of labelled examples is very expensive. Virtual
simulators are becoming common to create problems [170].
When the set of problems is large or generated, we clearly cannot evaluate AI systems efficiently with
the whole set M . So we need to do some sampling of M . It is at this point when we need to distinguish the
benchmark or problem definition from an effective evaluation. Assume we have a limited number of exercises
n that we can administer. The goal will be to reduce the variance of the measurement given n. One naive
approach is to sort M by decreasing p and evaluate the system with the first n exercises. This maximises
the accumulated mass for p for a given n. One problem about this procedure is that it is highly predictable.
Systems will surely specialise on the first n exercises. Also, this approach is not very meaningful when R
is non-deterministic and/or not completely reliable. Repeated testing may be necessary, which raises the
question of whether to explore a higher n or to perform more repetitions.
Random sampling using p seems to be a more reasonable alternative. As said above, if R is non-
deterministic and/or subject to measurement error, then random sampling can be with replacement. If M
and p define the benchmark, is probability-proportional sampling on p the best way to evaluate systems?
The answer is no, in general. There are better ways of approximating equation 1. The idea is to sample
in such a way that the diversity of the selection is increased. This ‘diversity-driven sampling” is related to
several kinds of sampling, such as importance sampling [156], stratified sampling [28] and other forced Monte
Carlo procedures. The key issue is that we use a different probability distribution for sampling. Although
there are many ways of obtaining a ‘diverse’ sample, we just highlight two main approaches that can be
useful for AI evaluation:
• Information-driven sampling: Assume that we have a similarity function sim(µ1, µ2), which indicates
how similar (or correlated) exercises µ1 and µ2 in M are. In this case, we need to sample on M such
that the accumulated mass on p is high and that diversity is also high. The rationale is that if µ1 and
µ2 are very similar, using one of them can ‘fill the gap’ of the other, and we can assume as if both µ1
and µ2 had been explored, actually accumulating p(µ1) + p(µ2). One possible way of doing this is by
cluster sampling. Information-driven sampling suffers from the need of defining the similarity function
sim. An alternative is to derive m features that describe the exercises, so creating an m-dimensional
space where distances and other topological information can be used to support the notion of diversity
(and performing clustering). An example of this procedure is shown in Figure 1 (left).
• Difficulty-driven sampling. A set M can contain very easy and very challenging problems. Using
easy problems for good systems or difficult problems for bad systems is not very optimal. The idea
to optimise the evaluation is to choose a range of difficulties for which the evaluation results may
be informative (or to give higher probability to exercises inside this range), as in Figure 1 (right).
This procedure is done to a greater or lesser degree in many evaluations and benchmarks in AI. In
fact, more challenging problems are usually added over the years, as the systems are able to solve
the easy problems (that soon become ‘toy problems’). One of the crucial points of difficulty-driven
sampling is the definition of a difficulty function d : M → R+. Ideally, we would like that for every
π,Φ(π, µ1, p) > Φ(π, µ2, p) iff d(µ1) < d(µ2). In practice, this condition is too strong, and more flexible
characterisations are expected, such as that for every π, and two difficulties a and b such that a ≤ b
we have that Φ(π,Ma, p) ≥ Φ(π,Mb, p) (where Ma denotes all the exercises in M of difficulty a). This
could still too strong and we may use a relaxed version such that for every π, there is a t such that for all
a and b ≥ a+ t: Φ(π,Ma, p) ≥ Φ(π,Mb, p). In experimental sciences, we have a population-based view
of difficulty such that d(µ) is monotonically decreasing on Eπ∈Ω[Φ(π, µ, p)], where Ω is a population
of subjects, agents or systems that are evaluated for the same problem class. In fact, Item Response
Theory [47] in psychometrics follows this approach. Finally, we can derive the difficulty of a problem
as a function of the complexity of the problem itself. The complexity metric can be specific to the
application (such as the complexity for mazes in [10, 192] or grid-world domains in [160]) or it can be
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Figure 1: Left: a repository M with |M | = 300 exercises shown with empty black circles. Two features x1
and x2 are used to describe the most relevant characteristics of the exercises (according to diversity). These
features are used to cluster them into five groups. Next, cluster sampling is performed with a sample size
of n = 50. Clusters are of different size (60, 20, 70, 110, 30) but 10 samples (shown in solid red circles) are
taken from each cluster. Because of the constant number of examples per cluster, in order to estimate Φ,
measurements for under-represented clusters are multiplied by their size. Right: a repository of |M | = 100
exercises. A measure of difficulty d has been derived that is monotonically decreasing with (estimated)
expected performance (for a group of agents or for the problem overall). Only n = 30 exercises are sampled
in the area where the results may be most informative.
a more general approach (e.g., Kolmogorov complexity). Note that some of the definitions of difficulty
above would not be possible for a set M and distribution p if the conditions of the NFL theorem held.
Both the information-driven sampling and the difficulty-driven sampling can be made adaptive. The first
is represented by what is known by adaptive cluster sampling [148] and it is common in population surveys
and many experimental sciences. However, when evaluating performance, it is difficulty-driven sampling
that has been used more systematically in the past, especially in psychometrics. In psychometrics, difficulty
is inferred from a population of subjects (in the case of AI, this could be a set of solvers or algorithms).
Instead of difficulty, items are analysed by proficiency, represented by θ, a corresponding concept to difficulty
from the point of view of the solver (higher problem difficulty requires higher agent proficiency).
Item response theory (IRT) [47] estimates mathematical models to infer the associated probability and
informativeness estimations for each item. When R is discrete or bounded, one very common model is the
three-parameter logistic model, where the item response function (or curve) corresponds to the probability
that an agent with proficiency θ gives a correct response to an item. This model is characterised as follows:
p(θ) , c+ 1− c
1 + e−a(θ−b)
where a is the discrimination (the maximum slope of the curve), b is the difficulty or item location (the value
of θ leading to a probability half-way between c and 1, i.e., (1 + c)/2), and c is the chance or asymptotic
minimum (the value that is obtained by random guess, as in multiple choice items). The zero-ability expected
result is given when θ = 0, which is exactly z = c + 1−c
1+eab
. Figure 2 (left) shows an example of a logistic
item response curve.
For continuous R, if they are bounded, the logistic model above may be appropriate. On other occasions,
especially if R is unbounded, a linear model may be preferred [127, 51]:
X(θ) , z + λθ + ϵ
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Figure 2: Left: item response function (or curve) for a binary score item with the following parameters for
the logistic model: discrimination a = 1.5, item location b = 3, and chance c = 0.1. The discrimination is
shown by the slope of the curve at the midpoint: a(1 − c)/4 (in dotted red), the location is given by b (in
dashed green) and the chance is given by the horizontal line at c (in dashed-dotted grey), which is very close
to the zero-proficiency expected result p(θ) = z (here at 0.11). Right: A linear model for a continuous score
item with parameter z = −1 and λ = 1.2. The dashed-dotted line shows the zero-ability expected result.
where z is the intercept (zero-ability expected result), λ is the loading or slope, and ϵ is the measurement
error. Again, the slope λ is positively related to most measures of discriminating power [52]. Figure 2 (right)
shows an example of a linear item response curve.
Working with item response models is very useful for the design of tests, because if we have a collection
of items, we can choose the most suited one for the subject (or population) we want to evaluate. According
to the results that the subject has obtained on previous items, we may choose more difficult items if the
subject has succeeded on the easy ones, we may look for those items that are most discriminating (i.e., most
informative) in the area we have doubts, etc. Note that discrimination is not a global issue: a curve may
have a very high slope at a given point, so it is highly discriminating in this area, but the curve will almost
be flat when we are far from this point. Conversely, if we have a low slope, then the item covers a wide range
of difficulties but the result of the item will not be so informative as for a higher slope.
Figure 3 shows an example of an adaptive test using IRT. The sequence of exercise difficulties is shown
on the left. The plot on the right shows that averaging the results (especially here, as the outcome of R is
discrete, either 0 or 1) makes the estimation of Φ more difficult with a non-adaptive test.
10
Item  Theta   SE    -3.......-2........-1.........0........+1........+2........+3
  0   0.00*  1.00*            --------------------X--------------------
  1   4.00*  1.00*                                .          -------------------->
  2   0.11   0.52                       -----------I----------
  3   0.20   0.45                         ----------C---------
  4  -0.04   0.35                         -------I-------
  5   0.05   0.32                           ------C------
  6  -0.13   0.29                         ------I------
  7  -0.07   0.27                          ------C-----
  8  -0.18   0.25                          -----I-----
  9  -0.25   0.25                         -----I-----
  10 -0.18   0.23                          -----C----
  11 -0.27   0.23                         -----I----
  12 -0.21   0.22                          ----C-----
  13 -0.26   0.22                          ----I----
  14 -0.34   0.22                         ----I-----
  15 -0.37   0.22                        -----I----
  16 -0.33   0.20                         ----C----
  17 -0.29   0.19                          ----C---
  18 -0.33   0.19                         ----I----
  19 -0.38   0.19                         ----I----
  20 -0.34   0.18                         ----C----
  21 -0.30   0.18                          ----C---
  22 -0.27   0.17                          ----C---
  23 -0.29   0.17                          ----I---
  24 -0.26   0.17                           ---C---
  25 -0.28   0.16                          ----I---
  26 -0.30   0.16                          ----I---
  27 -0.27   0.16                           ---C---
  28 -0.25   0.15                           ---C---
  29 -0.23   0.15                           ---C---
  30 -0.21   0.15                           ---C---
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Figure 3: An example of an IRT-based adaptive test (freely adapted from [179, Fig. 8]). Left: the process
and proficiencies (thetas) used until convergence. The final proficiency calculated by the test was −0.21 with
a standard error of 0.15. Right: The results shown on a plot. The black curve shows a Euclidean kernel
smoothing with a constant of 0.1.
Evaluation Setting Description
CADE ATP System Competition12 Theorem proving [162] using the TPTP library [161].
Termination Competition13 Termination of term rewriting and programs [120].
The reinforcement learning competition14 Reinforcement learning [184].
Syntax-guided synthesis competition15 Program synthesis [4].
International Aerial Robotics Competition16 Pilotless aircraft competition.
DARPA Grand Challenge17 Autonomous ground vehicles.
DARPA Urban Challenge18 Driverless vehicles.
DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge19 Computer security.
DARPA Save the day20 Rescue Robotic challenge [95].
The planning competition21 Planning [116].
UCI22 and KEEL23 Machine learning dataset repositories [9] [1].
PRTools24 Pattern recognition problem repository.
KDD-cup challenges25 and kaggle26 Machine learning and data mining competitions.
Plagiarism detection27 Plagiarism detection, authorship and social software misuse [134].
The General Video Game Competition28 General video game players [143].
Hutter Prize29 and related benchmarks30 Text compression.
Pedestrian benchmarks Pedestrian detection [59]
Europarl31, SE times corpus32, the euromatrix33 Machine translation corpora [157].
Linguistic data consortium corpora34 NLP corpora.
The Arcade Learning Environment35 Atari 2600 videogames (reinforcement learning) [12].
GP benchmarks36 Genetic programming [125, 182].
Pathfinding benchmarks37 Gridworld domains (mazes) [160].
FIRA HuroCup38 Humanoid robot competitions [6]
Table 2: List of some evaluation settings in the problem-benchmarks category.
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Table 2 includes a selection of evaluation settings in the problem benchmarks category. We see the
variety of repositories, challenges and competitions. As it is impossible to survey all of them in detail, we
will focus on one of them, perhaps the most widespread repository in computer science, the UCI machine
learning repository [9]. Most of the discussion below is applicable to other repositories and, to some extent,
to competitions and challenges in machine learning.
The UCI repository includes many supervised (classification and regression) and some unsupervised
datasets. The repository is publicly available and is regularly used in machine learning research. The usage
procedure, which is referred as “The UCI test” [118] or the “de facto approach” [44][96], follows the general
form of equation 1 where M is the repository, p is the choice of datasets and R is one particular performance
metric (accuracy, AUC, Brier score, F-measure, MSE, etc. [53, 76]). With the chosen datasets, several
algorithms (where one or more are usually introduced by the authors of the research work) can be evaluated
by their performance on the datasets. The aggregation over several datasets according equation 1, however,
is not very common in machine learning, as there is the general belief that averaging the results for several
datasets is wrong, as results are not commensurate (see, e.g., [34]). We already discussed this issue in section
2.1 and saw that there are ways to normalise the performance metric or use some utility measure instead
(e.g., what are the costs, in euros, of false positives and false negatives for each dataset) such that they can
be aggregated. Nonetheless, statistical tests are the predominant and encouraged approach to evaluation
validation by the machine learning research community.
“The UCI test” can be seen as a bona-fide mix of the problem benchmark approach and the peer
confrontation approach. Even if there is a repository (M), only a few problems are chosen, and can be
cherry-picked (p is changing and arbitrary). Also, as the researchers’ algorithm has to be compared with
other algorithms, a few competitors are chosen, which can also be cherry-picked, without much effort on
fine-tuning their best parameters. Finally, as the results are analysed by statistical tests, cross-validation or
other repetition approaches are used to reduce the variance of R(π, µ, p) so that we have fewer “ties”. This
procedure frequently leads to claims about new methods being better than the rest. Many of these claims
are, apart from uninteresting, dubious, even for papers in good venues. Nonetheless, the UCI repository is
not to blame for this procedure, but a methodology where statistical significance for a few datasets is more
valued than a commensurate average aggregate performance on a large collection of datasets.
As a result, there have been suggestions of a better use of the UCI repository. These suggestions imply
an improvement of the procedure but also of the repository itself. For instance, UCI+, “a mindful UCI”
[118], proposes the characterisation of the problems in the UCI repository by a set of complexity measures
from [85]. This characterisation can be used to make samples that are more diverse and representative. Also,
12http://www.cs.miami.edu/~tptp/CASC/
13http://termination-portal.org/wiki/Termination_Competition_2014
14http://www.rl-competition.org/
15http://www.sygus.org/
16http://www.aerialroboticscompetition.org/
17http://archive.darpa.mil/grandchallenge04/index.htm
18http://archive.darpa.mil/grandchallenge/
19http://www.darpa.mil/cybergrandchallenge/
20http://www.theroboticschallenge.org/
21http://ipc.icaps-conference.org/
22http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/
23http://sci2s.ugr.es/keel/datasets.php
24http://prtools.org/
25http://www.sigkdd.org/kddcup/index.php
26http://www.kaggle.com/
27http://pan.webis.de/
28http://www.gvgai.net/
29http://prize.hutter1.net/
30http://mattmahoney.net/dc/text.html
31http://www.statmt.org/europarl/
32http://www.statmt.org/setimes/
33http://matrix.statmt.org/matrix/info
34https://www.ldc.upenn.edu/new-corpora
35http://www.arcadelearningenvironment.org/
36http://gpbenchmarks.org/
37http://www.movingai.com/benchmarks/
38http://www.fira.net/contents/sub03/sub03_1.asp
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they discuss the notion of a problem being ‘challenging’, trying to infer a notion of ‘difficulty’. In the end,
an artificial dataset generator is proposed to complement the original UCI dataset. It is a distortion-based
generator (similar to Soares’s UCI++ [153]). Finally, [118] suggest ideas about sharing and arranging the
results of previous evaluations so that each new algorithm can be compared immediately with many other
algorithms using the same experimental setting. This idea of ‘experiment database’ [168] has already been
set up. Openml39 [167, 169], is an open science platform that integrates machine learning data, software and
results An automated submission procedure, such as Kaggle, if performed for a wide range of problems at a
time, could be a way of controlling some of the methodological problems of how the UCI repository is used.
Although some of these improvements are in the line of better sampling approaches (more representative
and more effective), there are still many issues about the way these repositories are constructed and used.
The complexity measures could be used to derive how representative a problem is with respect to the whole
distribution in order to make a more adequate sampling procedure (e.g., a clustering sampling). Also, a
pattern-based generator instead of a distortion-based generator could give more control of what is generated
and its difficulty. This could be done with a stochastic generative grammar for different kinds of patterns,
as is usually done with artificial datasets, using Gaussians or geometrical constructs. Finally, if results are
aggregated according to equation 1, the experimental setting and the use of repetitions should be overhauled.
For instance, by using 20 different problems with 10 repetitions using cross-validation (a very common setting
in machine learning experiments) we have less information than by using 200 different problems with 1
repetition. Choosing the least informative procedure only makes sense because of the way results are fitted
into the statistical tests and also because repetitions usually involve less effort than preparing a large number
of datasets.
Overall, even if the UCI repository and machine learning are very particular, many of the benchmarks
in Table 2 suffer from the same problems about how representative the problems are (if M is small) or how
representative the sample is (ifM is large). Other problems are the estimation of task difficulty and whether
M is able to discriminate between a set of AI systems. Also, none of the benchmarks in AI is adaptive.
2.4 Evaluation by peer confrontation
In the evaluation by peer confrontation, we evaluate a system by confronting it to another system. This
usually means that a match is played between peers. This is usual for games (including game theory) and
part of multi-agent research. The results of each match (possibly repeated with the same peer) may serve
as an estimation of which of the two systems is best (and how much). Nonetheless, the main problem about
this approach is that the results are relative to the opponents. This is natural in games, as people are said
to be good or bad at chess, for instance, depending of whom they are compared with.
Despite this relative character of the evaluation, we can still see the average performance according to
equation 1. In order to do this, we must first identify the set of opponents Ω. Then, the set of problems
M is enriched (or even substituted) by the parametrisation of each single game (e.g., chess) with different
competitors from Ω. In 1-vs-1 matches we have that |M | = |Ω| − 1 (if we do not consider a match between a
system and itself). In other multi-agent situations where many agents play at the same time, |M | can grow
combinatorially on |Ω|.
Nonetheless, for AI research, our main concern is about robustness and standardisation of results. For
instance, how can we compare results between two different competitions if opponents are different? If these
competitions are performed year after year, how can we compare progress? If there are common players, we
can use rankings, such as the Elo ranking [46], or more sophisticated rating systems [152, 121], to see whether
there are progress. In fact, it would be very informative for AI competitions based on peer confrontation to
keep all participants from previous editions in subsequent editions. However, this comes with a drawback,
as systems could specialise to the kind of opponents that are expected in a competition. If a high percentage
of competitors are inherited from previous editions, specialisation to those old (and bad) systems could
be common. It is insightful to think how many of these issues are addressed in sport competitions. For
instance, some tournaments adapt their matches according to previous information (by round, by ranking,
etc.). In fact, a league may be redundant (for the same reasons why the information-driven or difficulty-
driven sampling are introduced) and other tournament arrangements are more effective with almost the same
robustness and much fewer matches.
39http://openml.org/.
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Figure 4: We show the distributions of reward (roughly corresponding to R in this paper) for different
configurations for the multi-agent system SCMAS introduced in [70]. Left: the plot shows the results when
we confront each of the 2,000 policies with 50 different teams of competitors (with different seeds for the
generator also). This means that we have 2,000 × 50 = 100,000 experiments (300 environment steps each).
The results for a random agent (rnd) are also shown for comparison. Right: results when we choose the best 8
agents from the previous experiment. We see a wider range of results (but note that the average reward is lower).
As an alternative, games and multi-agent environments could be evaluated against standardised oppo-
nents. However, how can we choose a set of standardised opponents? If the opponents are known, the
systems can be specialised to the opponents. For instance, in an English draughts (checkers) competition,
we could have players being specialised to play against Chinook, the proven optimal player [141]. Again, this
ends up again in the design of an opponent generator. This of course does not mean a random player (which
is usually very bad), but players that can play well. One option is to use old systems where some parameters
are changed. Alternatively, a more far-reading approach is to define an agent language and generate players
(programs) with that language. As it is expected that this generation will not achieve very good players
(otherwise we would be facing a very simple problem), a possible solution is to give more information and
resources to these standardised opponents to make them more competitive (e.g., in some applications these
opponents could have more sophisticated sensor mechanisms or some extra information about the match
that regular players do not have).
Be the set Ω composed of old opponents or generated opponents, we need to assess whether Ω is sufficiently
challenging and whether it is able to discriminate the participants. For instance, some competitions in AI
finally award a champion, but there is the feeling that the result is mostly arbitrary and caused by luck, as
happens with many sport competitions40. How can we assess whether the set Ω has sufficiently difficulty
and discriminating power? This is of course a hard problem, which has recently be analysed in [70]. For
instance, Figure 4 shows the distribution of results of an agent competing in a multi-agent system according
to the complexity of the agent. The difficulty and discriminating power varies depending on the opponents
(left vs right plots).
Table 3 shows a sample of evaluation settings based on peer confrontation. Once again, because of
obvious space constraints, we will just choose one representative and interesting case from the table. We will
discuss the General Game Competition, which has been run yearly since 2005. According to the webpage41,
“general game players are systems able to accept descriptions of arbitrary games at runtime and able to
use such descriptions to play those games effectively without human intervention. In other words, they do
not know the rules until the games start”. Games are described in the language GDL (Game Description
Language). The description of the game is given to the players. Different kinds of games are allowed, such
40Statistical tests are not used to determine when a contestant can be said to be significantly better than another.
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Evaluation Setting Description
Robocup42 and FIRA43 Robotics (robot football/soccer) [100, 99].
General game playing AAAI competition44 General game playing using GDL [58].
World Computer Chess Championship45 Chess.
Computer Olympiad46 Board games.
Annual Computer Poker Competition47 Poker.
Trading Agents Competition48 Trading agents [181, 98].
Warlight AI Challenge49 Strategy games (Warlight).
Table 3: List of some evaluation settings in the peer-confrontation category.
as noughts and crosses (tic tac toe), chess, in static or dynamic worlds, with complete or partial information,
with varying number of players, with simultaneous or alternating plays, etc. The competition consists of
several rounds, qualifications, etc. For the competition, games are chosen —non-randomly, i.e., manually by
the organisers— from the pool of games already described in GDL and new games are also newly introduced
for the competition. As a result, game specialisation is difficult.
Despite being one of the most interesting AI competitions, there is still some margin for improvement.
For instance, a more sophisticated analysis of how difficult and representative each problem is would be use-
ful. For instance, several properties about the adequacy of an environment or game for peer-confrontation
evaluation could be identified and analysed depending on the population of opponents that is being con-
sidered [93]. Also, rankings (e.g., using the Elo system mentioned above) could be calculated, and former
participants could be kept for the following competitions, so there are more participants (and more overlap
between competitions). A more radical change would be to learn without the description of the game, as
a reinforcement learning problem (where the system learns the rules from many matches). An adaptation
between the general game playing and RL-glue, which is used in the reinforcement learning competition, to
make this possible has been done in [13].
Summing up our observations on peer confrontation problems, we see that the dependency on the set
|Ω| makes this kind of evaluation more problematic. Nonetheless, as AI research is becoming more socially
oriented, with significantly more presence of multi-agent systems and game theory, an effort has to be done
to make this kind of evaluation more systematic, instead of the plethora of arrangements that we see in
sports, for instance.
As a summary of this whole section about task-oriented evaluation, we have identified many issues in many
evaluation settings in AI. Nonetheless, the three types of evaluation settings have their niches of application
and task-specific evaluation is the right one in applications such as engineering, medicine, military devices,
etc. In fact, the series of workshops on Performance Metrics for Intelligent Systems, held since 2000 at the
National Institute of Standards & Technology [48, 128, 119, 145] is a good example of the usefulness of
this kind of evaluation. However, we hope that some ideas above can be used to make the evaluation more
controlled, automated and robust.
3 Towards ability-oriented evaluation
Many areas AI is successful nowadays took a long time to flourish in applications (e.g., driverless cars,
machine translators, game bots, etc.). Most of them correspond to specific tasks and require task-oriented
evaluation. Other tasks that are still not solved by AI technology are already evaluated in this way and
41http://games.stanford.edu/
42http://www.robocup.org/
43http://www.fira.net
44http://games.stanford.edu/
45http://www.icga.org/
46http://www.icga.org/
47http://www.computerpokercompetition.org/
48http://tradingagents.eecs.umich.edu/
49http://theaigames.com/competitions/warlight-ai-challenge/rules
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will be successful one day. However, if instead of AI applications we think about AI systems, we see that
there are some kinds of AI systems for which task-oriented evaluation is not appropriate. For instance,
cognitive robots, artificial pets, assistants, avatars, smartbots, smart houses, etc., are not designed to cover
one particular application but are expected to be customised by the user for a variety of tasks. In order to
cover this wide range of (previously unseen) tasks, these systems must have some abilities such as reasoning
skills, inductive learning abilities, verbal abilities, motion abilities, etc. Hence, this entails that apart from
task-oriented evaluation methods we may also need ability-oriented evaluation techniques.
Things are more conspicuous when we look at the evaluation of the progress of AI as a discipline. If we
look at AI with Minsky’s 1968 definition seen in the introduction, i.e., by achievement of tasks that would
require intelligence, AI has progressed very significantly. For instance, one way of evaluating AI progress
is to look at a task and check in which category an AI system is placed: optimal if no other system can
perform better, strong super-human if it performs better than all humans, super-human if it performs better
than most humans, par-human if it performs similarly to most humans, and sub-human if it performs worse
than most humans [137]. Note that this approach does not imply that the task is necessarily evaluated with
a human-discriminative approach. Having these categories in mind, we can see how AI has scaled up for
many tasks, even before AI had a name. For instance, calculation became super-human in the nineteenth
century, cryptography in the 1940s, simple games such as noughts and crosses became optimal in 1960s, more
complex games (draughts, bridge) a couple of decades later, printed (non-distorted) character recognition
in the 1970s, statistical inference in the 1990s, chess in the 1990s, speech recognition in the 2000s, and TV
quizzes, driving a car, technical translation, Texas hold ’em poker in the 2010s. According to this evolution,
the progress of AI has been impressive [18]. The use of human intelligence as a baseline has been used in
competitions (such as the humies awards50) or to define ratios, where median human performance is set
at a zero scale, such as the so-called Turing-ratio [122, 121], with values greater than 0 for super-human
performance and values lower than 0 for sub-human performance.
However, let us first realise that no system can do (or can learn to do) all of these things together. The
big-switch approach may be useful for a few of them (e.g., a robot with an advanced computer vision system
that detects whether it is facing a chess board or a bridge table and then switch to the appropriate program
to play the game that it has just recognised). Second, if we look at AI with McCarthy’s definition seen in
the introduction, i.e., by making intelligent machines, things are less enthusiastic. Not only has the progress
been more limited, but also there is a huge controversy for quantifying this progress (in fact, some argue that
machines are more intelligent today than fifty years ago while others say that there has been no progress at
all other than computational power). Hence, worse than having a poor progress or no progress at all, we
regard with contempt that we do not have effective evaluation mechanisms to evaluate this progress. It seems
that none of the evaluation settings seen in the previous section is able to evaluate whether the AI systems
of today are more intelligent than the AI systems of yore. Also, for developmental robotics and other areas
of AI where systems are supposed to improve their performance with time, we want to know if a 6-month-old
robot has progressed over its initial state, in the same way that we see how abilities increase and crystallise
with humans, from toddlers to adults. Ability-oriented evaluation, and not task-oriented evaluation, seems
to have a better chance of answering this question.
To make the point unequivocal, we could even go beyond McCarthy’s definition of AI without the use of
‘intelligence’ and define this view of AI as the science and engineering of making machines do tasks they have
never seen and have not been prepared for beforehand. Clearly, this view puts more emphasis on learning,
but it also makes it crystal clear that task-oriented evaluation, as have been performed for years, would not
fit the above definition.
It would be unfair to forget to acknowledge that some attempts seen in the previous section have made
an effort for a more general AI evaluation. The general game competition seen in the previous section is
one example of how some things are changing in evaluation. Users and researchers are becoming tired of
a big-switch approach. They yearn for and conceive systems that are able to cover more and more general
task classes. Nonetheless, it is still a limited generalisation, which is too based on a very specific range of
tasks. Many good players at the General Game Competition would be helpless at any game of the Arcade
Learning Environments, and vice versa. Actually, only some reinforcement learning (and perhaps genetic
programming) systems can at least participate in (adaptations to) of both games —excelling in them would
50www.human-competitive.org.
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not be possible though without an important degree of specialisation.
In the rest of this section we will introduce what an ability is and how they can be evaluated in AI. The
title of this section (starting with ‘Towards’) suggests that what follows is more interdisciplinary and contains
proposals that are not well consolidated yet, or that may even go in the wrong direction. Nonetheless, let us
be more lenient and have in mind that ability-based evaluation is much more challenging than task-specific
evaluation.
3.1 What is an ability?
We must first clarify that we are talking about cognitive abilities, in the same way that in the previous section
we referred to cognitive tasks. Some AI applications require physical abilities, most especially in robotics,
but AI deals with how the sensors and actuators are controlled, not about their strength, consumption, etc.
After this clarification, we can define a cognitive ability as a property of individuals that allows them to
perform well in a range of information-processing tasks. At first sight this definition may just look like a
change of perspective (from problems to systems). However, what we see now is that the ability is required,
and performance is worse without featuring the ability. In other words, the ability is necessary but it does
not have to be sufficient (e.g., spatial abilities are necessary but not sufficient for driving a car). Also, the
ability is assumed to be general, to cover a range of tasks. Actually, general intelligence would be one of
these cognitive abilities, one that covers all cognitive tasks: “general intelligence is a very broad trait that
encompasses quickness and quality of response to all cognitive tasks” [159].
The major issue about abilities is that they are ‘properties’, and as such they have to be conceptualised
and identified. While tasks can be seen as measuring instruments, abilities are constructs. In psychology,
many different cognitive abilities have been identified and have been arranged in different ways [142]. For
instance, one well-known comprehensive theory of human cognitive abilities is the Cattell-Horn-Carroll theory
[97]. Figure 5 shows a graphical representation of these abilities. The top level represents the g factor or
general intelligence, the middle level identifies a set of broad abilities and the bottom level may include
many narrow abilities. Again, this top level seems to saturate all tasks: “g is common to all cognitive tasks
including learning tasks” [2].
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Figure 5: Cattell-Horn-Carroll’s three stratum model. The broad abilities are Crystallised Intelligence (Gc),
Fluid Intelligence (Gf), Quantitative Reasoning (Gq), Reading and Writing Ability (Grw), Short-Term
Memory (Gsm), Long-Term Storage and Retrieval (Glr), Visual Processing (Gv), Auditory Processing (Ga),
Processing Speed (Gs) and Decision/Reaction Time/Speed (Gt).
Interestingly, this is not surprising from an AI standpoint. The broad abilities seem to correspond to
subfields in AI. For instance, looking at any AI textbook (e.g., [139]), we can enumerate areas such as
problem solving, use of knowledge, reasoning, learning, perception, natural language processing, etc., that
would roughly correspond to some of the cognitive abilities in Figure 5.
Can we evaluate broad abilities as we did for specific tasks? Application-specific (task-oriented) ap-
proaches will not do. But is ability-oriented evaluation ready for this? The answer, as we will see below, is
that this type of evaluation is still in a very incipient stage in AI. There are several reasons for this. First,
general (ability-oriented) evaluation is more challenging. Second, we no longer have a clear definition of the
task(s). In fact, defining the ability depends on a conceptualisation, and from there we need to find a set of
representative exercises that require the ability. And third, there have not been too many general AI systems
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to date, so task-oriented evaluation has seemed sufficient for the evaluation of AI systems so far. However,
things are changing as new kinds of AI systems (e.g., developmental robotics) are becoming more general.
Before starting with some approaches in the direction of ability-oriented evaluation, it can be argued
that some existing evaluation settings in AI are already ability-oriented. For example, even if the planning
competition features a set of tasks, it goes around the ability of planning, which is more general than any
particular task. However, the systems are not able to determine when planning is required for a range of
problems. In other words, the ability is not a resource of the system, but the very goal of the system. In the
end, it is the researchers who incorporate planning modules in several application-specific systems, and not
the systems that independently enable their planning abilities to solve a new problem.
3.2 The anthropocentric approach: psychometrics
Psychometrics was developed by Galton, Binet, Spearman and many others at the end of the XIXth century
and first half of the XXth century. An early concept that arose was the need of distinguishing tasks requiring
very specific knowledge or skills from general abilities. For instance, an “idiot savant” could have a lot of
knowledge or could have developed a sophisticated skill during the years for some specific domain, but could
be obtuse for other problems. On the contrary a very able person with no previous knowledge could perform
well in a range of tasks, provided they are culture-fair. This distinction took several decades to consolidate.
In a way, this bears resemblance with the narrow vs. general dilemma in AI.
Psychometrics is concerned about measuring cognitive abilities, personality traits and other psychological
properties [158]. Factors differ from abilities, in principle, in that they are obtained through testing and
further analysed through systematic approaches based on factor analysis. Some factors have been equated
and named after existing abilities while others are ‘discovered’ and receive new technical names. Several
indices can be derived from a battery of tests by aggregating abilities and factors. One joint index that
is usually determined from some of these tests is known as IQ (Intelligence Quotient). Although IQ was
originally normalised by the subject’s age (hence its name), its value for adults today is normalised relative
to an adult population, assuming a normal distribution with mean µ=100 and standard deviation σ=15.
This corresponds to a more sophisticated (normalised) aggregation of results for several items, which again
resembles our equation 1.
IQ tests incorporate items of variable difficulty. Item difficulty is determined by the percentage of subjects
that are able to solve the item, using functional models in Item Response Theory [117, 47], as seen in the
previous section. Note that this difficulty assessment is relative to the population and not derived from the
nature of the item itself.
IQ tests are easy to administer, fast and accurate, and they are used by companies and governments,
essential in education and pedagogy. IQ tests are generally culture-fair through the use of abstract exercises
(except for the verbal comprehension abilities).
As they work reasonably well for humans, their use for evaluating machines has been suggested many
times, even since the early days of AI, with the goal of constructing “a single program that would take a
standard intelligence test” [131]. More recently, their use has been vindicated by Bringsjord and Schmimanski
[20, 19], under the so-called ‘Psychometric AI’ (PAI), as “the field devoted to building information-processing
entities capable of at least solid performance on all established, validated tests of intelligence and mental
ability, a class of tests that includes not just the rather restrictive IQ tests, but also tests of artistic and
literary creativity, mechanical ability, and so on”. It is important to clarify that PAI is a redefinition or new
roadmap for AI —not an evaluation methodology— and does not further develop or adapt IQ tests for AI
systems. In fact, PAI does not explicitly claim that IQ tests (or other psychometric tests) are the best way
to evaluate AI systems, but it is said that an “agent is intelligent if and only if it excels at all established,
validated tests of intelligence” (later broadened to any other psychometric test) [20, 19]. The question of
whether these tests are a necessary and sufficient condition for machines and the limitations of PAI as a
guide for AI research have been recently discussed in [14].
Not surprisingly, this claim that IQ tests are the best way to evaluate AI system has recently come from
human intelligence research. Detterman, editor of the Intelligence Journal, wrote an editorial [35] where
he suggested that Watson (the then recent winner of the Jeopardy! TV quiz [54]) should be evaluated
with IQ tests. The challenge is very explicit: “I, the editorial board of Intelligence, and members of the
International Society for Intelligence Research will develop a unique battery of intelligence tests that would
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Test IQ Score Human Average
A.C.E. IQ Test 108 100
Eysenck Test 1 107.5 90-110
Eysenck Test 2 107.5 90-110
Eysenck Test 3 101 90-110
Eysenck Test 4 103.25 90-110
Eysenck Test 5 107.5 90-110
Eysenck Test 6 95 90-110
Eysenck Test 7 112.5 90-110
Eysenck Test 8 110 90-110
IQ Test Labs 59 80-120
Testedich IQ Test 84 100
IQ Test from Norway 60 100
Average 96.27 92-108
Table 4: Results by a rudimentary program for passing IQ tests (from [140]).
be administered to that computer and would result in an actual IQ score” [35]. Detterman established two
levels for the challenge, a first level, where the type of IQ tests can be seen beforehand by the AI system
programmer, and a second level, where the types of tests would have not seen beforehand. Only computers
passing the second level “could be said to be truly intelligent” [35]. The need for two levels seems related
to the big-switch approach and the problem overfitting issue, which we have already mentioned in previous
sections for AI evaluation settings. It is apposite at this point to recall that academic and professional IQ
tests and many other standardised psychological tests are never made public, because otherwise people could
practise on them and game the evaluation. Note that the non-disclosure of the tests until evaluation time is
something that we only find in very few evaluation settings in the previous section.
Detterman was unaware that almost a decade before, in 2003, Sanghi and Dowe [140] implemented a
small program (less than 1,000 lines of code) which could score relatively well on many IQ tests, as shown
in Table 4. The program used a big-switch approach and was programmed to some specific kinds of IQ
tests the authors had seen beforehand. The authors still made the point unequivocally: this program is not
intelligent and can pass IQ tests.
While it must be conceded that the results only reach the first level of Detterman’s challenge —so there
is a test administration issue (i.e., an evaluation flaw)—, there are some weaknesses about human IQ tests
that would also arise if a system passed the second level as well. In particular, “the editorial board of
Intelligence, and members of the International Society for Intelligence Research” could be tempted to devise
or choose those IQ tests that are more ‘machine-unfriendly’. If AI systems eventually passed some of them,
the battery could be refined again and again, in a similar way as how CAPTCHAs are updated when they
become obsolete. In other words, this selection (or battery) of IQ tests would need to be changed and made
more elaborate year after year as AI technology advances. Also, the limitations of this approach if AI systems
ever become more intelligent than humans are notorious.
The main problem about IQ tests is that they are anthropocentric, i.e., they have been devised for
humans and take many things for granted. For instance, most assume that the subject can understand
natural language to read the instructions of the exercise. On top of that, they are specialised to some human
groups. For instance, tests are significantly different when evaluating small children, people with disabilities,
etc. Also, the relation between items and abilities have been studied during the past century exclusively
using humans, so it is not clear that a set of items would measure the same ability for a human or for
a machine. For instance, is it reasonable to expect that well-established tests of choice reaction time be
correlated with intelligence in machines as they are correlated in humans [32]? Or, what makes a set of
psychometric tests different from a set of “human intelligence tasks” in Amazon Mechanical Turk [22]. For
a more complete discussion about why IQ tests are not ready for AI evaluation, the reader is referred to a
response [41] to Detterman’s editorial. Having said all this and despite the limitations of IQ tests for AI
evaluation, their use is becoming more popular in the past decade (including robotics, [144]) and systems
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whose results are like those of Table 4 are becoming common (for a survey, see [79], for an open library of
IQ tests, see pebl.sourceforge.net/battery.html).
As just said, one of the problems of IQ tests is that they are specialised for humans. In fact, standardised
adult IQ tests do not work with people with disabilities or children of different ages. In a similar way, we do
not expect animals to behave well on a standard human IQ test, starting from the fact that they will not be
able to read the text. This leads us to the consideration of how cognitive abilities are evaluated in animals.
Comparative psychology and comparative cognition [149, 150] are the main disciplines that perform this
evaluation. For a time, much research about cognitive abilities in animals was performed on apes. The term
‘chimpocentric’ was introduced as a criticism about tests that had gone from being anthropocentric to being
chimpocentric. Nonetheless, in the past decades, the perspective is much more general and any species may
be a subject of study for comparative psychology: mammals (apes, cetaceans, dogs and mice), birds and
some cephalopods. The evaluation focusses on “basic processes”, such as perception, attention, memory,
associative learning and the discrimination of concepts, and recently on more sophisticated instrumental or
social abilities [150].
One of the most distinctive features of animal evaluation is the use of rewards, as instructions cannot
be used. This setting is very similar to the way reinforcement learning works. Animal evaluation has also
brought attention to the relevance of the interface. Clearly, the same test may require very different interfaces
for a dolphin and a bonobo.
Human evaluation and animal evaluation have become more integrated in the past years, and testing pro-
cedures half way between psychometrics and comparative cognition are becoming more usual. For instance,
several kinds of skills are evaluated in human children and apes in [81]. In recent years, many abilities that
were considered exclusively human have been found to some extent in many animals.
Does the enlargement from humans to the whole animal kingdom suggest that these tests for animals can
be used for machines? While the lower ranges of the studied abilities and the use of rewards can facilitate
its application to AI systems significantly, we still have many issues about whether they can be applied to
machines (at least directly). First, the selection of tasks and abilities is not systematic. Second, many of the
tasks that are applied to animals would be too easy for machines (e.g., memory). And third, others would
be too difficult (e.g., orientation, recognition and interaction in the real world). Nonetheless, there is an
increasing need for the evaluation of animats [185] and the evaluation procedures for animals are the first
candidates to try.
3.3 Evaluation using AIT
A radically different approach to AI evaluation started in the late 1990s. If intelligence was viewed as
a “kind of information processing” [26] then it seemed reasonable to look at information theory for an
“essential nature or formal basis of intelligence and the proper theoretical framework for it” [26]. This was
finally done with algorithmic information theory (AIT), and the related notions of Solomonoff universal
probability [155], Kolmogorov complexity [113] and Wallace’s Minimum Message Length (MML) [174, 175].
There are several good properties about algorithmic information theory for evaluation. First, several
definitions of information and complexity can be defined exclusively in computational terms, actually relative
to a Universal Turing Machine (UTM), a fundamental and universal model of effective computation. For
instance, the Kolmogorov complexity of an object (expressed as a binary string) relative to a UTM is defined
as the shortest program (for that machine) that describes/outputs the object. Even if these definitions
depend on the UTM that is used, the invariance theorem states that their values will only differ with respect
to other UTM up to a constant that only depends on the two different UTMs (because one can emulate the
other) [113]. The notion of algorithmic probability, introduced by Solomonoff, allows a universal distribution
to be defined for each UTM, which is just the probability of objects as outputs of a UTM fed by a fair coin.
While, in general, this means that compressible strings are more likely than incompressible ones, it can be
shown that every computable probability distribution can be approximated by a universal distribution. In
a way, Solomonoff, the father of algorithmic probability [155] gave a theoretical backing to Occam’s razor.
There are reasons to think that many phenomena and, as a result, many of the problems that we face every
day, follow a universal distribution. This is directly linked to equation 1 again, and the discussion about the
choice of the probability p. Also, we have the relevant fact, which is very significant for evaluation as well, that
all universal distributions are immune to the no-free-lunch theorems, where system performance can differ
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k = 9 : a, d, g, j, ... Answer: m
k = 12 : a, a, z, c, y, e, x, ... Answer: g
k = 14 : c, a, b, d, b, c, c, e, c, d, ... Answer: d
Figure 6: Several series of different complexity 9, 12, and 14 used in the C-test [65].
very significantly for induction [107, 82]. And finally, Kolmogorov complexity and algorithmic probability are
two sides of the same coin, which led to a formal connection of compression and inductive inference. It has
been acknowledged that Solomonoff “solved the problem of induction” [154, 38]. Of course, not everything
in AIT is straightforward. For instance, some of these concepts lead to incomputable functions, although
approximations exist, such as Levin’s Kt [111].
The application of AIT to (artificial) intelligence evaluation started with a variant of the Turing Test
that featured compression problems [39, 40] to make the test more sufficient. While one of the goals of this
work was to criticise Searle’s Chinese room [147] (an argument that has faded with time), this is one of the
first intelligence test proposals using AIT. At roughly the same time, a formal definition of intelligence in
the form of a so-called C-test was derived from AIT [80, 65]. Figure 6 shows examples of sequences that
appear in this test. They clearly resemble some exercises found in IQ tests. The major differences are that
(1) sequences are obtained by a generator (a UTM with some post-conditions about the generated sequence,
ensuring the unquestionability of the series continuation and less dependency on the reference machine) and
(2) the fact that each sequence is accompanied by a theoretical assessment of difficulty (a variant of Levin’s
Kt complexity). Note the implications for evaluation of such a test, as exercises are derived from first
principles (instead of being contrived by psychometricians) and the difficulty of these exercises is intrinsic,
and not based on how difficult humans find them. Finally, these sequences were used to define a test by
aggregating results in a way that highly resembles our recurrent equation 1, where M is formally defined as
including all possible sequences (following some conditions) and the probability is defined to cover a range
of difficulties, leading to a difficulty-driven sampling as in Figure 1 (right).
Some preliminary experimental results showed that human performance correlated with the absolute
difficulty (k) of each exercise and also with IQ test results for the same subjects. This encourages the use of
this approach for IQ-test re-engineering. With the aim of a more complete test for machines, some extensions
of the C-test were suggested, such as transforming it to work with interactive agents (“cognitive agents [...]
with input/output devices for a complex environment” [80] where “rewards and penalties could be used
instead” [66]) or extending them for other cognitive abilities [67]. Despite its explanatory power about IQ
tests, this line of research was sharply dashed in 2003 (at least as general intelligence tests for machines) by
the evidence that very simple —non-intelligent— programs could pass IQ tests [140], as we have discussed
in section 3.2 (see Table 4).
Nonetheless, the extension to interactive agents was performed anyway. Interestingly, when agents and
environments are considered in terms of equation 1, we just find a performance aggregation over a set of
environments, exactly as had been formulated several times in the past: “intelligence is the ability of a
decision-making entity to achieve success in a variety of goals when faced with a range of environments” [55].
Note that this roughly corresponds to the psychometric view of general intelligence as key to performance
in a range (or all) cognitive tasks. A crucial aspect was then to define this range of environments, i.e., the
choice of the distribution in equation 1. One option was to include all environments. In order to do this in
a meaningful, elegant way (and get rid of any no-free lunch theorem), AIT and reinforcement learning were
combined [109]. Equation 1 was instantiated with all environments as tasks with a universal distribution
for p, i.e., p(µ) = 2−K(µ), with K(µ) being the Kolmogorov complexity of each environment µ. Another
approach was to include all environments up to a given size or complexity, and a limit of steps [36, 37].
These proposals present several problems. First, some constructions are not computable, so approxima-
tions need to be used. Second, most environments are not really discriminative, and all agents will score
the same, will just ‘die’ or be stuck after a few steps (this issue is partially addressed, with the use of
ergodic environments [109] or world(s) where agents cannot make fatal mistakes [36]). Third, overweighting
very small environments (by the use of a universal distribution or a complexity limit) makes the definition
very dependent on the reference machine chosen as environment generator. Finally, time (or speed) is not
considered for the environment or for the agent. For more details about these (and other) issues and some
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possible solutions, the reader is referred to [82] and [71, secs. 3.3 and 4]. Taking into account these solutions,
some actual tests have been developed [92, 91, 94, 110]. While the results may still be useful to rank some
state-of-the-art machines, if they are not compared to humans (or animals), as we discuss in the following
section, the validation (or more precisely the refutation) of these tests as true intelligence tests cannot be
done.
Summing up, the AIT approach is characterised by the definition of tests from formal information-based
principles. This is in stark contrast to other approaches where tasks are collected, refined by trial-and-error
or invented in a more arbitrary way. Most of the approaches to AI evaluation using AIT seen above have
aimed at defining and measuring general intelligence, which is placed at the very top of the hierarchy of
abilities (and hence at the opposite extreme from a specialised task-oriented evaluation). However, many
interesting things can happen if AIT is applied at other layers of the hierarchy, for general cognitive abilities
other than intelligence, as suggested in [67] for the passive case and hinted in [71, secs. 6.5 and 7.2] for
the dynamic cases, with the use of different kinds of videogames as environments (two of the most recently
introduced benchmarks and competitions are in this direction [12, 143]). Finally, the information-theoretic
approach is not isolated from some of the approaches seen so far in section 2. Actually, some hybridisations
and integrated approaches have been proposed [74, 43, 78, 77, 90] (apart from the compression-enriched
Turing Tests ([39, 40] already mentioned above).
3.4 Universal psychometrics
Figure 7 shows the fragmentation of the approaches seen in previous sections. As we see, this fragmentation
is originated by the kind of measurement we are interested in (task-oriented or ability-oriented, collected or
AIT-derived tests) but most especially by the kind of subject that is being measured. In [71], the notion
of ‘universal test’ is introduced, as a test that is applicable to “any biological or artificial system that
exists at this time or in the future”: human, non-human animal, enhanced human, machine, hybrid or
collective. The stakes were set high, as the tests should work without knowledge about the subject, derive
from computational principles, be unbiased (species, culture, language, ...), require no human intervention,
be practical, produce a meaning score, and be anytime (the more time we have for the test the higher the
reliability of the score). Note that in order to apply the same test to several subjects we are allowed to
customise the interface, provided the features and difficulty of the items are remained unaltered. Also, we
need to think about the speed of the subject, and adapt to it accordingly. Also, the capabilities of the subject
can be quite varied, so the ranges of difficulty need to adapt to the agent. That suggests that universal tests
must necessarily be adaptive.
A first framework for universal, anytime intelligence tests is introduced in [71], where a class of envi-
ronment is carefully chosen to be discriminative. The test starts with very simple environments and adapts
to the subject’s performance and speed. In this regard, this resembles a difficulty-driven sampling as de-
scribed in section 2.3. The set of tasks (environments) were developed upon some of the ideas about using
AIT for intelligence evaluation, as seen in section 3.3. Some experiments were performed [92, 91, 94], using
the environment class defined in [68]. Difficulty was estimated using a variant of Levin’s Kt. As a way
of checking whether the results were meaningful, the same test compared Q-learning [178] with humans.
Two different interfaces were designed on purpose. The test gave consistent results for Q-learning and hu-
mans when considered separately, but were less reasonable when put together. The experimental settings
featured many limitations (simplifications, non-adaptiveness, absence of noise, low-complexity patterns, no
incrementality, no social behaviour, etc.) and, probably because of this, the results did not show the actual
difference between Q-learning and humans. Despite the limited results, the experiment had quite a reper-
cussion [101, 15, 73, 191]. Nonetheless, the tests were a first effort towards a universal test and highlighted
some of the challenges.
One concern about a generator of environments is the lack of richness of interaction and social behaviours
that is expected. In other words, an environment that is randomly generated will have an extremely low
probability of showing some social behaviour, which is a distinctive trait of human intelligence. This has
suggested other ways of generating the environments and ways of incorporating other agents into them (e.g.,
the Darwin-Wallace distribution [74]), but it is still an open research question how to adapt these ideas to
the measurement of social intelligence and multi-agent systems [43, 90, 70, 93].
The fragmentation of Figure 7 and the need of solving many of the above issues has suggested the
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Figure 7: A schematic representation of the fragmentation of the different approaches for intellgience evalu-
ation depending of the kind of intelligent systems.
Homo sapiens
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Machine Kingdom
Universal Psychometrics
Figure 8: The realm of evaluable subjects for universal psychometrics.
introduction of a new perspective, dubbed ‘universal psychometrics’ [75]. Universal psychometrics focusses
on the measurement of cognitive abilities for the ‘machine kingdom’, which comprises any (cognitive) system,
individual or collective, either artificial, biological or hybrid. This comprehensive view is born with many
hurdles ahead. Evaluation is always harder the less we know about the subject. The less we take for
granted about the subjects the more difficult it is to construct a test for them. For instance, human
intelligence evaluation (psychometrics) works because it is highly specialised for humans. Similarly, animal
testing works (relatively well) because tests are designed in a very specific way to each species. And some
of the AI evaluation settings we have already seen work because they are specialised for some kind of AI
systems that are designed for some specific applications. In the case of AI, who would try to tackle a more
general problem (evaluating any system) instead of the actual problem (evaluating machines)? The answer
to this question is that the actual problem for AI is the universal problem. Notions such as ‘animat’ [185],
machine-enhanced humans [30], human-enhanced machines [171], other kind of hybrids and, most especially,
collectives [136] of any of the former, suggest that the distinction between animals, humans and machines is
not only inappropriate, but no longer useful to advance in the evaluation of cognitive abilities. The notion
of ‘machine kingdom’, as illustrated in Figure 8, is not very surprising to the current scientific paradigm but
clarifies which class of subjects is most comprehensive.
Universal psychometrics attempts to integrate and standardise a series of concepts. A subject is seen
as a physically computable (resource-bounded) interactive system. Cognitive tasks are seen as physically
computable interactive systems with a score function. Interfaces are defined between subjects and tasks
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(observations-outputs, actions-inputs). Cognitive abilities are seen as properties over set of cognitive tasks
(or task classes). As a result, the separation between task-specific and ability-specific becomes a progressive
thing, depending on the generality of the class. Distributions are defined over task classes and results as
aggregated performance on a task class (again, a generalised version of equation 1). Difficulty functions are
computationally defined from each task. Overall, some of these elements found in psychometrics, comparative
cognition and AI evaluation are overhauled here with the theory of computation and AIT. As a result,
cognitive abilities are no longer what the cognitive tests measure, as in human psychometrics (adapting the
(in)famous statement that intelligence is “what intelligence test measures” [17]), but they are properties that
emanate from (general) classes of tasks, perfectly defined in computational terms. As a consequence, the
relation between abilities can be explored experimentally, but also theoretically, and measures are absolute
and not relativised wrt. a population (except for social abilities). This could imply some revitalisation of
the white-box approach, especially for those AI systems that can be formally described in a theoretical way
(e.g., some results in [88] and [82] take a white-box evaluation approach).
This view of a cognitive ability is consistent with its association with a “class of cognitive tasks” [25] that
must be ‘representative’ for the ability. From the association between abilities and classes of tasks, “we see
that by merging two cognitive task classes we get a more general cognitive task class, and a more general
ability. Typically, this is studied in a hierarchical way, starting with the so-called elementary cognitive tasks
[25, page 11] (closely related to the notion of primary mental abilities of [163])” [75]. This redraws our
dilemma between task-oriented and ability-oriented into a gradual hierarchy from specific tasks to general
abilities, with general intelligence at the very top (including all possible cognitive tasks, i.e., all interactive
Turing machines with a score function). The questions about how to sample from a task class for an effective
evaluation can be generalised from our discussion in section 2.
This sets a dual view of cognitive tasks on one hand and cognitive systems on the other hand, where
both spaces (the ability space and the machine kingdom) can be explored. Interestingly, both cognitive tasks
and cognitive systems are defined as interactive systems, reflecting a duality world-agent. One singularity
of cognitive systems (as well as their environments they are in) is that they can evolve with time, and their
abilities can change. In other words, it seems that some abilities need to be constructed on top of other
previously consolidated abilities, and this seems to be independent of the subject to some extent, in the same
way that it seems difficult to be able to multiply without being able to add. A theoretical analysis of ability
interdependency, how they can develop and the notion of potential intelligence, are still in a very incipient
stage [86, 87, 72].
There can be objections and disagreements about the way many of the above concepts should be under-
stood and defined. There can also be objections about what a universal test should look like [42]. But a
more integrated view of cognitive abilities for humans, animals, robots, agents, animats, hybrids, swarms,
etc., is not only possible but useful. Bear in mind that universal psychometrics does not exclude the use
of non-universal tests, as tests that are non-universal can be more efficient (tests can be universal or not,
depending on the application), but aims at having a more integrated and well-founded view of how intelligent
systems are evaluated in terms of cognitive abilities.
4 Conclusions
We started this paper looking at the way AI evaluation is commonly performed, through task-oriented
evaluation, mostly with a black-box approach. We identified several problems and limitations, and we
noticed that there is still a huge margin of improvement in the way AI systems are evaluated. The key issues
are the set of tasks M and their distribution p, as well as distinguishing the definition of the problem class
(aggregation) from an effective sampling procedure (testing procedure). Then we switched to ability-oriented
evaluation, a much more immature approach, but that may have a more relevant role in the future. The
notion and evaluation of abilities is more elusive than the notion and evaluation of tasks. We have argued that
this requires the integration of several perspectives that are currently scattered efforts in AI, psychometrics,
AIT and comparative cognition. The different areas, philosophies, tools, foundations, terminologies and the
different kinds of subjects to be evaluated can be unified with an integrated perspective known as universal
psychometrics. Here, the exploration of the machine kingdom is dual to the exploration of the set of possible
cognitive abilities/tasks. In both spaces we aim at becoming more general, which is where evaluation is
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Figure 9: Tests become more or less challenging depending on the generality of the class of subjects under
consideration (from subject-specific to universal) and the class of abilities (from task-oriented evaluation to
ability-oriented evaluation).
more challenging (see Figure 9). This resembles the duality in the theory of computation (e.g., problem
classes and automata classes). The more formal approach advocated by universal psychometrics can make
the white-box evaluation approach recover some relevance in AI.
From the problems and limitations found in AI evaluation and the tools and ideas that have appeared
along the paper, we now enumerate a number of generic guidelines. These can be considered when an AI
evaluation setting is under consideration.
• The definition of Ω, the set of possible systems that can be evaluated (or that can be opponents in
peer confrontation evaluation), must be clarified from the beginning. Any information about their
proficiency and expected characteristics may be very useful. If humans are considered, the way in
which they are admitted and how they are instructed must be defined. The more general Ω is the less
we can assume about the evaluation process. If Ω is heterogeneous (e.g., a universal test), different
interfaces must be considered.
• The definition of M , the set of possible tasks, and its associated distribution p configure what we are
measuring. This can be built from a set of problems or using a generator. This pair ⟨M,p⟩ has to be
representative of a task (in task-oriented evaluation) or an ability (in ability-oriented evaluation). If
it is a peer confrontation evaluation, M will be enlarged with as many combinations between game
(environment) and agents in Ω are possible. The distribution p will be updated accordingly.
• The definition of R and its aggregation Φ must ensure that the values R(µ) for all µ ∈ M are going
to be commensurate and that the aggregation is bounded. An analysis about expected measurement
error is useful at this point. The robustness of R depending on the length or time left for each episode
will indicate whether repetitions are needed to reduce the measurement error given by R(µ).
• As much as possible, the similarity between tasks or a set of features describing them should be
identified. An intrinsic difficulty function (even if approximate) is always very useful. Showing the
distribution of difficulty forM can be highly informative. If difficulty is available, item response curves
could be prepared.
• The sampling method must be as much efficient as possible, by using, e.g., a clustering sampling or a
range of difficulties if we have a non-adaptive evaluation. For the peer-confrontation evaluation, the
arrangement of matches can be designed beforehand if the evaluation is not adaptive. Similarly, the
procedure for an adaptive evaluation must also be carefully designed to ensure measurement robustness.
Simulations can be useful to estimate this.
• Information about how the evaluation is performed (including R, Φ and some illustrative problems)
can be disclosed to the systems that are being evaluated (or to their designers). However, Ω, M and p
should not be disclosed. If possible, the problems should not be disclosed after the evaluation either,
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as keeping them secret makes it possible to compare with the same problems for different subjects or
at different times (e.g., we can evaluate progress of a system or a discipline during a period).
• After the evaluation, results must be analysed beyond the mere calculation of the aggregated results.
Item response functions and agent response functions [75] can be constructed empirically from the
results and compared with the theoretical functions or any other information about Ω and M . Dis-
crepancies or anomalies may suggest that the evaluation setting has to be revised. Results of the
evaluation must become public at the highest possible detail, so they can be analysed and compared
by other researchers and participants (following, e.g., the notion of ‘experiment database’ [168], such
as in the machine learning community51).
It is of course an open question to what extent the above recommendations will be followed on a regular basis
for AI evaluation. It can be argued whether AI evaluation has been a priority for AI in the past, but it seems
that it has not been recognised as an imperative problem or a mainstream area of research. If this is the
case, this paper can help change this perspective. Anyhow, the question of AI evaluation remains and there
is space for significant improvement, even for the most specific sets Ω and M (bottom-left part of Figure 9).
At the other end, measuring intelligence and doing it universally is a key ingredient for understanding what
intelligence is (and, of course, to devise intelligent artefacts). Many interesting questions and applications
lay in the middle of Figure 9, as AI evaluation is no longer limited to task-specific evaluation of AI systems
or to evaluating progress in AI. Instead, AI is becoming able to evaluate systems that learn to solve instead
of systems that are programmed to solve.
In any case, and with any of the approaches seen so far, a more scientific theory of AI evaluation is being
required for many applications (CAPTCHAs, social networks, agent certification, etc.) and it will be more
and more common in a future with a plethora of bots, robots, artificial agents, avatars, control systems,
‘animats’, hybrids, collectives, etc. It is also crucial for the technological singularity once (and if) achieved
[45], especially because some of the prophecies and forecasts disregard that the first thing to consider about
the singularity is to have metrics to detect whether and where AI progresses towards it.
Summing up, AI requires an accurate, effective, non-anthropocentric, meaningful and computational way
of evaluating its progress, by evaluating its artefacts. This paper can serve as a comprehensive source of the
state of the art of the AI evaluation, its challenges and the avenues for future work.
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